��ƷSM����ӰƬ

Economic ties to U.N. powers a factor in where peacekeepers go

Civil wars have killed some 17 million people since the end of World War II. And while they rage mostly within national borders, their costs all too commonly metastasize to their neighbors, even sometimes causing havoc regionally.

The World Bank has gone so far as to label civil wars “development in reverse” because they increase poverty, spread disease and provide a safe haven for illegal activity. And once a nation falls into the “civil war trap,” it can be hard to get out: Almost half of all civil wars in which hostilities cease are reignited within five years.

One proven tool in breaking that cycle is the presence of U.N. peacekeeping troops. Sending in the blue helmets can reduce the chances that a low-level conflict will erupt into full-blown civil war by more than 50 percent, according to studies.

Yet U.N. troops are deployed to just 38 percent of civil conflicts, says Jaroslav Tir, professor of political science at the ��ƷSM����ӰƬ.

“U.N. peacekeeping stands out as a fairly effective to prevent civil wars from restarting,” says Tir, a native of Croatia, which struggled with civil conflict in the 1990s. “It’s not cheap, but compared to other things, it also cost-effective.”

Tir and Symon M. Stojek, a graduate student at the University of Georgia, wondered why, given that the tool is known to be effective, it’s used in only about a third of civil wars around the world. In their paper, “The supply side of United Nations peacekeeping operations: Trade ties and United Nations-led deployments to civil war states,” published recently in the , they conclude that the answer can be found—as with so many things—by following the money.

Specifically, nations torn by civil strife that have strong extant trade relations with the United Nations’ key decision-making states—notably the five permanent members, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China, and Germany and Japan, which between them fund nearly three-quarters of all peacekeeping missions—have a 20-percent higher likelihood of receiving peacekeepers and hence, breaking the cycle of war.

"If the U.S. goes it alone into some country, it looks like it’s out for self interest. In some parts of the world, that smells like imperialism or neo-colonialism."

“Our model suggests that conflicts in economically isolated countries are less likely to receive attention from the U.N. than are conflicts in more economically engaged states,” the authors write.

That makes economic sense, Tir says. War destroys markets and trade, so nations have more incentive to invest their peacekeeping resources in places where the cessation of violence will have tangible economic benefits.

The permanent U.N. Security Council members, known as the P5, “are, so to speak, looking for a good return of investment of their peacekeeping dollars,” the authors write. “The intensity of the economic relationship between the P5 and the civil war state at the time when the civil war nears its end represents a credible signal of future economic value.”

Of course, not all P5 members are equal. The United States far outpaces all other members, funding 27.17 percent of peacekeeping costs in 2010, followed by non-P5 member Japan (12.53 percent), the UK (8.16), non-P5 Germany (8.02), France (7.56), non-P5 Italy (5 percent), and China (3.94). Russia, the fifth permanent member, comes in at number 11, funding just 1.98 percent of peacekeeping costs.

Despite the imbalance, Tir notes that by funding the lion’s share of peacekeeping costs, the United States gains numerous advantages. First, it can usually keep its own troops out of the field. In addition, U.N. peacekeeping serves as a kind of “Laundromat” through which the United States can protect its interests while participating as a member of the international community.

A United Nations’ peacekeeper in Lebanon in 2011. U.N. photo/Christopher Herwig.

“If the U.S. goes it alone into some country, it looks like it’s out for self interest,” Tir says. “In some parts of the world, that smells like imperialism or neo-colonialism.”

Meanwhile, given that the United States foots more than a quarter of the bill, other member states are typically willing to defer when it gets behind a peacekeeping effort.

“If the U.S. wants peacekeeping troops somewhere and is willing to pay, China and Russia usually don’t care,” Tir says. “They may not put up money, but they won’t stand in the way.”

The implication of the study, in part, is that more trade and interconnectedness between major U.N. member nations and other countries can prevent civil conflicts from spiraling out of control. Tir cites the current war in Syria as an example of how isolation can translate into the world turning away.

“The regime there is very internationally isolated. So when rebels started making demands, the government had no pressure or incentive to making concessions,” he says. “There were so few levers the international community to get the government to agree to any sort of negotiated solution with the rebels.”

The result, in part, has been the spilling of that civil conflict across borders in the Middle East and the establishment of the Islamic State, which continues to embroil the region in conflict across thousands of miles of territory.

“(W)hile economic arguments may seem overly simplistic and ethically murky, increasing economic interdependence has a positive externality of placing the stability of important trade partners on the agenda of major powers,” the authors conclude. “Markets may not be humanitarian, but when humanitarian efforts are in line with the market interest, we can expect more trade, more peacekeeping, and, if peacekeeping research is correct, more peace.”

Clay Evans is a free-lance writer in Boulder.