

## DISSERTATION ABSTRACT OF JOONGSAN HWANG

This dissertation is

about a game between two players and another person. This dissertation is the first to analyze these games using game theory and solves for the Nash equilibria of the games.

In the first chapter, I analyze discrete rendezvous games. When players' travel times are instantaneous to the meeting place, I find that the players never wait for each other. When players' travel times are stochastic, the player who departs early and waits for the other player is revealed to have a high value of meeting but the other player's value of the meeting is lower.

When travel time variation is small, agreeing on a back-up meeting time can improve social welfare. When a player knows that the other player has a high value of meeting, the player may choose to depart late and make the other player wait for her.

In the second chapter, I analyze continuous rendezvous games.

When players may be unable to depart when they want to, + ( To increase meeting chance and social welfare, players can agree to compensate each other for arriving early and waiting. Alternatively, they can agree to not depart early but wait for each other.

In the last chapter, I extend the model of the first and second chapters by adding signals. Now, players send claimed departure times simultaneously with their actual departure. In this setting, I analyze different types of PBE's, Perfect Bayesian equilibria. The most important PBE is the Partially Revealing PBE. Here, players alternate between telling the whole truth, being ambiguous and lying. In being