overview
Graham Oddie (PhD, London, 1979) began studying philosophy at the University of Otago (New Zealand). While Oddie was an undergraduate at Otago, Sir Karl Popper came for a year as a Visiting Professor. The Otago faculty were all instructed by the Chair to discuss Popper's ideas in the weekly colloquium. When it came to his turn, Pavel Tich媒 proved that Popper's theory of truthlikeness had the following devastating consequence: that no false proposition could be closer to the truth than any other. This was a disaster for Popper's account of scientific progress but for Oddie it came as a pleasant revelation: that in philosophy you could actually prove interesting stuff. This made a life in philosophy seem attractive. Not long after that, he began working with Tich媒 on a new idea for truthlikeness, and wrote a PhD on the topic at the London School of Economics, which morphed into the first book-length treatment of the topic: (Reidel, 1986). Oddie returned to Otago as a Lecturer, moving a few years later to be Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Massey University, and thence to 精品SM在线影片 in 1994. He served as Chair of the Philosophy Department for several years, and then as Associate Dean for Humanities and the Arts for several more. These days he is happy being a full-time philosopher again.
Areas of Interest: Metaphysics, Value Theory, Metaethics, Formal epistemology, Philosophical Logic, Aesthetics.
Current Research: current research is focused on metaphysics (in particular, a general role ontology), value theory (realism, additivity, epistemology), desire, preference, and cognitive value.
For more information, see Professor Oddie's , , and CV.
selected papers
- "Propositional and credal accuracy in an indeterministic world", Synthese 199 (3-4) 2021: 9391-9410.
- "What Accuracy Could Not Be", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70听 (2) 2019:551-580.
- 鈥淰alue perception, properties and the primary bearers of value鈥� in Anna Bergqvist and Robert Cowan (eds.) Evaluative Perception, (Oxford University Press, 2018), 239-258.
- 鈥淭ruth and Truthlikeness鈥�, in Glanzberg, M. (ed.)听 Oxford Handbook of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 625-648.
- "Non-naturalism, autonomy and entanglement" Topoi (2017): DOI: 10.1007/s11245-017-9454-z, pp. 1-14.
- 鈥淒esire and the good: finding the right fit鈥�, in Deonna, J. and Lauria, F. The Nature of Desire (Oxford University Press, 2017), 29-56.
- 鈥淲hat do we see in museums?鈥� in Harrison, V.S., Bergqvist, A. and Kemp, G., (eds.) .听 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 79, (2016), pp. 217-240: 10.1017/S1358246116000047.
- 鈥淔itting attitudes, finkish goods, and value appearances鈥� Russ Schafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, (Oxford University Press, 2016), 74-101.
- 鈥淰alue and desires鈥� in Olson, J. and Hirose, I. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Value听 (Oxford University Press, 2015),听 60-79.
- 鈥溾��, Les Ateliers De L鈥櫭塼hique (La Revue de Cr茅um) Special Issue on: Attitudes, Values, Environment Volume 9, num茅ro 2, 茅t茅 2014,听 57-81.
- 鈥淐ontent, consequence and likeness: on three approaches to verisimilitude and their compatibility鈥� Synthese 190 (9):1647-1687 Jun 2013.
- 56听听 鈥淭he fictionalist鈥檚 attitude problem鈥�, (with Dan Demetriou) in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. (2007), 10: 485-98.听 (Primary author)
- 鈥淎 refutation of Peircian idealism鈥�, in Colin Cheyne (ed.) Rationality and Reality (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2006), 255-62.
- 鈥淩ecombinant values鈥�, Philosophical Studies 106 (2001), 259-92.
- 鈥淪crumptious functions鈥�, Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (2001), 137-56.
- 鈥淗ume, the bad paradox and value realism鈥�, Philo 4 (2001), 109-22.
- 鈥淎xiological atomism鈥�, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001), 313-32.
- 鈥淧ermanent possibilities of sensation鈥�, Philosophical Studies 98 (2000), 345-59.
- 鈥淢oral realism, moral relativism and moral rules (a compatibility argument)鈥�, Synthese 117 (1999), 251-74.
- 鈥淐onditionalization, cogency and cognitive value鈥�, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1997), 533-41.
- 鈥淜illing and letting-die: from bare differences to clear differences鈥�, Philosophical Studies 88 (1997), 267-87.
- 鈥淗armony, Purity, Truth鈥�, Mind 103 (1994), 452-72.
